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COMMERCIAL-BANK UNDERWRITING OF MUNICIPAL
REVENUE BONDS: A SELF-REGULATORY APPROACH
The Glass-Steagall Act,1 one of the basic charters of commercial bank power in the United States, specifies those activities in
which commercial banks 2 may participate and those in which
they may not. Among the activities generally prohibited to commercial banks are the underwriting and dealing in securities 3
other than federal-government bonds and certain municipal securides 4-specifically, the "general obligations of any State or any
political subdivision thereof." 5 This exception to the general
prohibition makes no mention of the type of municipal security
1 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of
12, 15, 39 U.S.C.).
2

Commercial banks accept deposits and make loans to businesses and indiAND BAN
rG5-12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Micim]. Other banking institutions, such as savings and loan
associations, savings banks, and credit unions, provide different services to different
markets. See generally 8 Micim, supra, at 1-2 nn.1 & 3 (1971). These institutions
are chartered under a variety of federal and state laws. See generally 1 Micr ,
supra, at 12-18. State-chartered banks may or may not become members of the
federal reserve system. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1976).

viduals. See generally 1 A. H. MCmHE, BANs

3The Glass-Steagall Act states:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse,
solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case
for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of
securities or stock ....
12 U.S.C. §24, Seventh (1976).
In addition, 12 U.S.C. §378(a)(1) (1976)
makes it unlawful for any organization to engage simultaneously in securities
transactions and deposit banking. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,
624 (1971).
4 The term "municipal security" will be used hereinafter in its broadest sense
to mean all tax-exempt securities issued by state and local governments or their
agencies. Municipal securities include both general obligation and revenue bonds.
See note 6 infra.
512 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (1976) ("The limitations and restrictions herein
contained as to dealing in, underwriting and purchasing for its own account,
investment securities shall not apply to obligations of the United States, or general
obligations of any State or of any political subdivision thereof .... "). See also
12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (1) (1976), which exempts from illegality those securities
activities of national- or state-chartered federal reserve member banks which are
allowed under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
It should be noted that these provisions do not prevent those state-chartered
banks which are not members of the federal reserve system from engaging in
securities activities. As of June 30, 1978 there were 9,077 nonfederal reserve
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known as "revenue bonds." 6 In 1968, the District of Columbia
Circuit held 7 that the failure of Congress to include revenue
bonds among the securities exempted from the Glass-Steagall Act
implied that commercial banks were forbidden to underwrite or
8
deal in these securities.
Since that decision both legislators and commentators have
debated whether the Glass-Steagall Act should be amended to permit commercial banks to underwrite revenue bonds in addition
to general obligation bonds. Several bills have been proposed
in Congress to effect such modification of the Act. 9 In congresmember banks and 5,621 member banks. The assets of the nonmember banks,
however, only amounted to approximately $326.5 billion as compared with $888.6
billion in member banks. 65 FED. REs. BULL. A17 (1979).
The securities
activities of state-chartered nonmember banks will not be discussed in this
Comment.
6 Revenue bonds are obligations of state or local governments or governmental
agencies such as independent authorities which are backed by revenues from the
operation of government projects, such as highways, bridges, electric utilities,
housing projects and the like. Often such bonds are issued to raise money for
construction of such facilities, the revenue from which is then used to pay off the
debt. See L. Mox & A. HnrasousE, CoxcsrTs AND PAcncEs 3N LOCAL
GovEm'MENT FNANcE 320 (1975).

Revenue bonds are to be contrasted with

general obligation bonds, which are backed by the full taxing power of the governmental unit that issues them. Id. 317. Because the latter are secured by the
full faith and credit of the issuing government, general obligation bonds are
theoretically less risky than revenue bonds, which depend for their redemption on
the income stream of a successful project.
Not all facilities constructed from the proceeds of revenue bonds have proved
successful. One well-known default, for example, involved the Calumet Skyway
Bonds issued by the city of Chicago to construct an expressway. Id. 324. Generally speaking, defaults (i.e., late payment) on revenue bonds have been rare in
the postwar period. See Mehie, Bank Underwriting of Municipal Revenue Bonds:
Preserving Free and Fair Competition, 26 SYRAcuSE L. RFv. 1117, 1131 (1975).
Whether this trend will continue in the face of municipalities' increasing fiscal
difficulties is less certain. See text accompanying note 115 infra.
7Port Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
s Militating against the Port Authority interpretation is the fact that revenue
bonds were rarely issued in the 1930s when the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted.
See note 14 infra & accompanying text. This suggests that Congress may have
simply overlooked revenue bonds when it drafted the exemption clause in 12
U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (1976). Had the legislators been aware of revenue bonds,
it is argued, they would have permitted banks to deal in them for the same reason
that dealing in general obligation bonds was allowed-to preserve government
borrowing sources considered crucial to national recovery. See Mehle, supra note 6,
at 1125 n.43.

9 A list of proposed bills and hearings on proposed Glass-Steagall Act amendments up to 1975 can be found in Mehle, supra note 6, at 1118-19 n.7. Since
1975, H.R. 13609, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), S. 1378, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); H.R. 1539, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); and H.R. 4494, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) have also been introduced. H.R. 1539 was the subject of hearings
in the fall of 1979, but no report has been published.
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sional hearings,10 scholarly 1 and financial 12 journals, and occasionally in the general press,13 the debate has continued.
The intensity and duration of the debate is attributable, in
large measure, to the size of the stakes for the underwriting participants. Although the revenue-bond market was only a small
portion of the municipal-securities business at the time the GlassSteagall Act was passed, 14 in the past thirty years it has steadily
grown. In the first three quarters of 1979, revenue bonds accounted
for approximately seventy percent of the new issues of municipal
securities.' 5 The passage of Proposition 13 and other state constitutional-debt-limitation provisions is likely to further increase the
amount of state and local debt issued as revenue bonds.'" All told,
!he effect of permitting banks to underwrite revenue bonds would
be to more than double the volume of securities business available
to banks.17
1OThe last major hearings on the issue of bank revenue-bond activities were
Trading in Municipal Securities: Hearings on S. 1933 and S. 2474 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Hearings]. Another valuable
set of hearings is Bank Underwriting of Revenue Bonds: Hearings on S. 1306
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Hearings].
"See, e.g., Hopewell & Kaufman, Commercial Bank Bidding on Municipal
Revenue Bonds: New Evidence, 32 J.FINA-CE 1647 (1977); Kessel, A Study of
the Effects of Competition in the Tax-exempt Bond Market, 79 J. PoL. EcoN. 706
(1971), reprinted in 1974 Hearings, supra note 10, at 276.
12 See, e.g., Two heads are better than Congress, ThE EcoNoMST, Dec. 15,
1979, at 66; A British merchant banker looks at America's Class-Steagall Act,
INSTIrUTIONAL. INVEsTOR, June 1979, at 17 (int'l ed.).
13 See, e.g., the debate that flared briefly on the New York Times op-ed page
after an editorial in favor of bank revenue-bond underwriting was printed. The
original editorial can be found at N.Y. Times, May 16, 1979, at 26, col. 1, with
letters pro and con at N.Y. Times, May 29, 1979, at 22, col. 4, and N.Y. Times,
June 13, 1979, at 24, col. 4. An editorial reaffirming the original editorial was
published at N.Y. Times, June 13, 1979, at 24, col. 1, and further letters appeared
at N.Y. Times, June 23, 1979, at 20, col. 5, and N.Y. Times, July 25, 1979, at 22,
col. 3. See also Banks May Win a Revenue Bond Drive, Bus. WEEK, June 11,
1979, at 31.
141974 Hearings, supra note 10, at 215; 1967 Hearings, supra note 10, at 135.
IrOut of approximately $35.353 billion in long-term municipal securities issued
from January to October 1979, approximately $10.453 billion were general obligations and $24.899 billion were revenue bonds. PuBuc SEcuarrs AssocsAsoN,
MumcsnA.t MARKET DwEvEoPvmNrrs, Tables 1, 2A, 2B (Dec. 20, 1979). By
contrast, in 1960 $4.36 billion in general obligations and $2.07 billion in revenue
bonds were issued. JOINT EcoN. Comm., 94th CoNG., 2d SEss., CHANGING CONDITIONS IN THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 6 (Comm.

Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as Joint EcoN. Comm.].
16 For the impact of Proposition 13 and its progeny, see 32
(Supp. June 1979).
17 See note 15 supra.
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The debate over commercial-bank participation in the revenue-bond market has been dominated by the larger and more
vociferous participants in the municipal-securities marketplace:
the commercial bankers, the investment bankers, and the municipal
issuers.' 8 Very little attention has been devoted to the impact of
such activity on those who purchase the securities: the investors.
Is the present regulatory machinery adequate to ensure fair transactions? If disclosure requirements are imposed on revenue-bond
issuers, can they be enforced? Will the entrance of commercial
banks into the revenue-bond market unduly strain existing safeguards? These questions must be faced-before the decision to
permit commercial-bank participation in the revenue-bond market
is made.
This Comment takes the position that the existing regulatory
framework simply will not withstand the entrance of commercial
banks into the revenue-bond market. In part I, this framework
Is Commercial bankers would like to underwrite revenue bonds not only because
the market is so large, see notes 14-16 & accompanying text, but also because it is
so profitable. Most revenue bond underwritings are conducted as "negotiated
transactions" in which negotiations between the issuer and investment banker set
the optimum terms for financing. See Joehnk & Kidwell, Comparative Cost Study
Favors Competitive Bidding Over Negotiation, WzmxLY BoND BuxE (P.S.A. Conf.
Supp. No. 1), Oct. 8, 1979, at 16. General obligation bond underwriters, on the
other hand, are usually selected on the basis of closed, competitive bids. Id. See
also S. RPro.No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CoDE CoNG.
& AD. NEWS 179, 217 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]; Pnrurc SEconuEs AssocrAmoN,
MuNcirsAL MAKET DEvELopmNTS Table 5 (Dec. 20, 1979). Empirical analysis
suggests that negotiated transactions are more lucrative to underwriters than are
competitive underwritings. See Joehnk & Kidwell, supra, at 16-17; Sorensen, The
Impact of Underwriting Method and Bidder Competition Upon Corporate Bond
Interest Cost, 34 J. FINANCE 863, 869 (1979).
Support for an amendment allowing banks to underwrite revenue bonds has
not come just from bankers. The potential economic benefits to state and local
governments from commercial-bank underwriting has attracted the issuers' attention
as well. Economic studies have asserted that the effect of opening the revenue
bond market to commercial banks would be to increase the number of underwriters
competing for the issuer's business and would thereby enable the issuer to bargain
for the lowest possible interest cost. See Kessel, A Study of the Effects of Competition in the Tax-exempt Bond Market, 79 J. POL. ECON. 706 (1971), reprinted in
1974 Hearings, supra note 10, at 276; 1967 Hearings, supra note 10, at 282 (Staff
Study Prepared by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
Opponents of commercial bank underwriting-usually investment bankerschallenge these economic arguments. They claim that competitive inequalities
would eventually drive many securities firms from the market, thus negating any
competitive gain that might initially be realized. See, e.g., 1974 Hearings, supra
note 10, at 328 (statement of Nimrod Frazer) & at 378 (statement of Simon
Whitney). Recently the SEC has taken up this position on behalf of the securities
industry. See, e.g., Bank Revenue Bond Underwriting Could Mean Big Losses For
Small Brokerage Firms, SEC Staff Says, [1979] 525 SEC. REc. & L. REP. (BNA)
A-4; SEC Raises Doubts About Bill to Extend Bond-Underwriting Authority of
Banks, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1979, at 34, col. 1.
The inequalities in competition between banks and securities firms are discussed in Meble, supra note 6, at 1137-46.
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is outlined and the source of its weakness-dual enforcement by
the securities and banking industries-emerges. Part II explores
the conflicting regulatory policies and philosophies of these two
industries. In Part III, the Comment examines two specific problems which result from the dual enforcement scheme and which
may prove highly significant should banks be allowed to underwrite municipal revenue bonds: 1) the inability of the banking
industry to police trading abuses in the revenue-bond market;
and 2) the impossibility of devising satisfactory disclosure requirements in a bifurcated enforcement system. In part IV, the Comment concludes that commercial-bank participation in the revenuebond market is feasible only if the market is policed, not by the
securities and banking industries, but by a self-regulatory organization of municipal-securities dealers, capable of independently
promulgating and enforcing rules tailored to their market's special
characteristics. A self-regulatory organization with such powers
can only come to pass if commercial banks are required to conduct
their underwriting activities in separate municipal-securities affiliates.' 9 This should be the price of their admission to the revenue-

bond market, since such a separation of underwriting activities
will be harder to accomplish after expansion of such activities
has taken place.
I.

EXISTING REGULATION OF THE MUNICIPALSECURITIES MARKET

Until 1975 the purchase and sale of municipal securities were
subject only to certain of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. 20 A series of exemptions in the basic securities
acts placed these securities outside the disclosure and registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 21 and the broker-dealer
regulations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.22 The turbulence in the municipal-securities market caused by the financial
collapse of New York City,23 coupled with an increase in the num19 See notes 141-200 infra & accompanying text.
20

See S. REP., supra note 18, at 42, reprinted in [19751 U.S. CODE CONC. &

AD. NEws at 220. See generally In re New York Municipal Securities Litigation,
[Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 197,258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act].
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act].
The extent of municipal securities regulation prior to 1975 is well-summarized

in Dikeman, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board: A New Concept of SelfRegulation, 29 V-w-. L. 1Ev. 903, 905-07 (1976).
2
3 For a sympathetic view of the affair see Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves a
City: The New York Case, 1976 DusE LJ. 1119. A less sympathetic view is found
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ber of "household", as opposed to institutional, investors purchasing municipal bonds, 24 led Congress to enact the Securities Act
Amendments of 1975,25 designed in part "to subject municipal
securities professionals to essentially the same regulatory scheme
that applies to other securities activities." 26 These new provisions
do not go so far as to impose the 1933 Act registration and disCongress
closure requirements on municipal-securities issuers.2 7
contented itself with supplementing the existing federal antifraud
provisions 25 by extending the registration requirement of section
15 of the 1934 Act to brokers and dealers conducting transactions
2
in municipal securities. 9
The changes in the 1934 Act did not stop, however, with the
extension of broker-dealer regulation to the municipal-securities
industry. Recognizing the differences between the corporate- and
municipal-securities marketplaces 30 and the absence of a self-regulatory system in the latter, Congress established a new entity, the
This new
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB).3 1
in SEC, Final Report in the Matter of Transactions in Securities of the City of
New York, See. Act Rel. No. 33-6021, reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff81,936.
24 See S. fEap., supra note 18, at 42, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 219-20; Dikeman, supra note 22, at 908. The increase in the number
of unsophisticated investors at the time was coupled with an increased number of
SEC enforcement actions against abusive trading in municipal securities. See
SEC Litigation Rel. Nos. 5583 & 5584 (Oct. 26, 1972); 6005 (Aug. 2, 1973);
6032 (Aug. 22, 1973); 6451 (July 24, 1974); 6575 (Nov. 6, 1974); and 6733
(Feb. 13, 1975), involving seven injunctive actions against 72 defendants.
25 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
26 S. REP. supra note 18, at 43, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 221.
27
Section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(2) (1976), still
exempts "[a]ny security issued or guaranteed... by any State of the United States,
or by any political subdivision of a State or territory, or by any public instrumentality of one or more States or territories" from the provisions of the Act. Section
12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976) exempts the same class of securities from its
express liability provisions.
28 Municipal securities are not exempted from the antifraud provisions of § 17
of the 1933 Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1976); nor are they excluded from the
coverage of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1976).
29 This was accomplished by amending the definition of "exempted securities"
in §3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(12) (1976), to exclude
municipal securities for purposes of § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976). In addition, a
new §15B(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §78o-4(a)(1) (1976), was enacted requiring the
registration of all"municipal securities dealers," a category designed to reach bank
dealers who were not subject to § 15 because banks were excluded from the definition
of broker-dealers under § 3(a) (4)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4)-(5) (1976).
30 See S. EP., supra note 18, at 40, 48, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 218, 226.
31
Section 15B(b)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78o-4(b)(1) (1976).
Unlike the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the Board is not
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entity was empowered to "adopt rules to effect the purposes of
[the 1934 Act] with respect to transactions in municipal securities
effected by brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers." 32
Responsibility for formulating rules of conduct in municipalsecurities transactions is thus lodged in a specialized, unitary body.83
Enforcement of these regulations, however, is not as straightforward.
Since the Glass-Steagall Act allows commercial banks to underwrite and deal in the general obligations of state and local governments,3 4 the municipal-securities marketplace, unlike the corporatesecurities marketplace, is populated by members of both the banking and securities industries. These two industries were already
subject to separate regulatory systems-the three federal banking
agencies 35 oversaw the banking community, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was responsible for the securities community. Imposition of a separate layer of regulation for the municipal-securities market was resisted by both camps.8 6 Congress
therefore scrapped its original plan to give the MSRB both promulgation and enforcement powers 37 and instead arranged a compromise whereby the regulations promulgated by the MSRB would
be enforced by the banking agencies and the SEC in cooperation
with each other.3 8 The MSRB itself was left with neither inspection nor enforcement powers.
composed of industry participants, but consists of 15 members, five of whom
represent municipal securities brokers and dealers other than banks; five of whom
represent municipal securities dealers that are banks; and five of whom are public
members, including representatives of investors and municipal issuers. Id. For a
description of the composition and function of the MSRB, see Dikeman, supra
note 22.
32 Section 15B(b)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2) (1976). See
S. REP., supra note 18, at 47-48, reprinted in[1975] U.S. CODE CoN. & AD. NEWs
at 225-26.
83 But see note 69 infra & accompanying text.
34
See notes 1-5 supra & accompanying text.
WThe term "banking agencies" refers to the three major federal regulators of
commercial banks: the Comptroller of the Currency, wbo regulates national banks
under the National Banking Act of 1864, Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, as amended,
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); the Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
which regulates state member banks under 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1976) and
bank holding companies under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and
the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850
(1976); and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which regulates insured
nonmember banks under 12 U.S.C. § 264 (1976).
3
6See 1974 Hearings, supra note 10, at 122 (statement of David R. Murphey),
219 (statement of Leland S. Prussia, Jr.); Dikeman, supra note 22, at 909-10.
37S. 2474, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1973), reprinted in1974 Hearings, supra
note 10, at 25 (proposed § 15B(b)(2)(B)).
See also
38Section 15B(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78o-4(c) (1976).
S. REP., supra note 18, at 47, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS
at 225.
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Since the rules of the MSRB have existed only a short while,3 9
it is too early to draw concrete conclusions about the effectiveness
of dividing disciplinary powers. An examination of the intrinsic,
structural differences 40 between the banking and securities industries, however, reveals that the dual enforcement scheme-devised to
placate both industries-is fraught with difficulties. The SEC, comfortable in its role as securities regulator, approaches the task of
municipal-securities regulation with one set of priorities.41 The
banking agencies-so different from the SEC in philosophy and perspective-approach the task with another. 42 The result is an uneven, inefficient enforcement system which may prove inadequate to
protect investors' interests if banks are allowed to underwrite
municipal-revenue bonds.
II. THE HYPoTHEsIs:

DuAL ENFORCEMENT AS UNEVEN

ENFORCEMENT

A. Protecting Depositors and Investors:
The Difficulty of Serving Both Masters
Bank and securities regulators have different outlooks and
priorities because they represent two very different groups: bank
depositors and securities investors. Indeed, the basic objective of
the Glass-Steagall Act was to keep these two groups apart and insulate depositors' funds entrusted to the banks from the risks associated with securities transactions. 43 Thus, banks were prohibited
from dealing in most securities; the only exceptions-federal-government bonds and municipal general obligations-were less risky and
hence were not seen as a threat to the bank depositor.4 4
Today, however, the perils of bank involvement in these socalled "low risk" securities cannot be ignored. For one thing,
municipal securities do carry a risk-New York City and Cleveland
3

9 See Walison, Self-Regulation of the Municipal Securities Industry, 6 SEc.

REG. L.J. 291, 311 (1979).
40

4'

See notes 43-59 infra & accompanying text.
See notes 43-50 infra & accompanying text.

42Id.

43 See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971); Investment
Co. Inst. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 606 F.2d 1004, 1012 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. granted 48 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1980) (No. 79-927).
44
See Port Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497, 501 (1968) ("Congress' broad purpose in granting eligibility to general obligations of states and
political subdivisions was clearly to limit bank underwriting to issues of unquestioned financial integrity.").

1980]

MUNICIPAL REVENUE BONDS

1209

made that clear enough.45 And those who underwrite or deal in
such securities apparently cannot escape liability under the federal
antifraud laws. In a recent case growing out of New York City's
fiscal turmoil, a federal judge ruled that an implied private right
of action was available under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 46 to purchasers of municipal bonds who alleged
deceptive practices by a group of underwriters and sellers-including several commercial banks.47 Although the merits of the plaintiffs' claims in In re New York Municipal Securities Litigation4S
have not yet been reached, the case does suggest that a finding of
liability against a bank-defendant is a real possibility, and could
affect the soundness of a bank-if not in fact, at least in the public's
perception. Indeed, in other contexts, concern has been expressed
that if banks are allowed to enter nonbanking activities, failure of
the bank in these activities will be interpreted by the public as
49
failure of the bank itself.
Such implications may have an important diminishing effect
on the zeal with which bank regulators pursue evidence of securities
fraud and enforce MSRB rules designed for the protection of investors.5 1 Bank regulators are made to work at cross-purposes when
they are asked not only to protect depositors but to help investors
pursue banks-and indirectly, their depositors-to recover damages.
B. Contrast in Regulatory Philosophies
Reliance on bank regulators as watchdogs for investors also
ignores the longstanding difference in regulatory technique between
the bank agencies and the SEC. The premise of most bank regulation is that depositor protection is best served, not by full disclosure
of abuses, but by forceful discipline with a minimum of publicity,
45

See note 23 supra & accompanying text and notes 114-15 infra & accompanying text.
46 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
47
1n re New York Municipal Securities Litigation, [Current] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH)
97,258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The complaints allege that city officials
and certain banks and brokerage firms deliberately misled the public in connection
with the underwriting and subsequent resale of various city obligations. Acting on
inside information gained from their status as creditors to the city, the banks
allegedly helped distribute $2.6 billion in long-term notes, the proceeds of which
were then used to bail out the banks' own holdings in short-term notes, before the
disclosure of the city's desperate financial condition caused bond prices to plummet.
48 Id.
49 Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HA.v. L. REv.
787, 833 (1979).
5
OSection 15B(b)(2)(C) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78o-4(b)(2)(C)
(1976).
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so as to preserve public confidence in banks. 51 Direct pressure and
supervision by the agency is preferred to the SEC's practice of investigating publicly, thereby helping investors make informed decisions. This fundamental contrast in regulatory philosophy has
been observed by administrators, 52 lawmakers,53 and commentators.5 4
5i Recently the Comptroller of the Currency stated his views on a consistent
approach to banking regulation:
Historically, the overriding goal of the principal bank regulatory agencies
has been the maintenance of economic stability. This goal is addressed
through a variety of strategies and functions ....
[Most of these] attempt, in one way or another, to minimize the
number of individual bank failures and maintain confidence in the banking
system. The latter goal is of overriding importance ....
Heimann, The Philosophy of Regulation of the Banking System, 34 REc. A.B.
Crry N.Y. 13, 14 (1979).
52 See, e.g., the remarks of a former SEC Commissioner:
Bank regulators are primarily responsible to maintain the strength
and stability of the banking system . . . . Bank requirements and
standards are enforced in a "direct" way out of concern that public
knowledge of improper bank activities would cause a loss of confidence
by depositors ....
The basic thrust of our securities laws and regulations is full and
adequate disclosure of all material information . . . as well as the establishment of standards for those who participate in any activities relating
When [noncompliance] is found
to the purchase or sale of securities ....
.. . the Commission takes enforcement action which is disclosed to the
public so that both present and prospective investors may have a basis on
which to make investment decisions.
Address by John R. Evans, Ninth Annual Banking Law Institute (May 2, 1974),
reprinted in 1974 Hearings, supra note 10, at 57, 59-60.
53The difference in attitude toward publicity is evident in the statutory
language: compare § 22 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78v (1976) ("Hearings [by
the Commission] may be public .... ") with a comparable banking law provision,
...).
12 U.S.C. § 1818(h) (1) (1976) ("Such hearing shall be private, unless.
54 See, e.g., Lybecker, Bank-Sponsored Investment Management Services:
Consideration of the Regulatory Problems, and Suggested Legislative and Statutory
Interpretive Responses, 1977 Doam L.J. 983, 1037 (footnote omitted):
Moreover, it seems clear that, relatively speaking, persons in the
securities industry offering . . . services are subject to quite detailed
regulation but limited direct supervision, while the banking industry, on
the other hand, is subject to enormous amounts of direct supervision but
very limited external guidance through rules or regulation. While the
former system might be criticized by some for "overregulation" of business
decisions, the latter system has a more significant disadvantage. Because
there is little role for private attorneys general, effective regulation is
highly dependent upon on-site visitation and an expensive examining and
supervisory staff. When coupled with relatively few regulations, that type
of regulatory framework, it seems, leaves the unnecessarily lingering
suspicion that bank regulators (or banks) cannot or will not tolerate an
outside investigation, that only bank regulators (or banks) are competent
to judge appropriate regulatory controls, and that the regulatory process
is best carried out with maximum secrecy and minimum public scrutiny.
See also Lehner, In Lance's Wake: More Disclosure of Bank Affairs, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 31, 1977, at 16, col. 6 ("Historically, bank regulation has rested on the
'paternalistic old notion' that 'bankers and regulators can solve problems better if
bank stockholders and depositors are ignorant.'") (quoting Professor Roy A.
Schotland).
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The difference emerged dramatically in the SEC's investigation of
the securities activities of banks, undertaken in response to congressional request in 1975.55 The SEC found particularly distressing the banking agencies' performance in administering consumerprotection regulation pertinent to banks. The agencies, by their
own admission, simply did not enforce these regulations aggressively.5 6
Such observations suggest that federal bank agencies are not
likely to provide maximum investor protection in the municipalsecurities market. They may even thwart the SEC's efforts in this
regard. For, although the SEC remains free to enforce the general
antifraud provisions 5 7 of the securities laws against bank dealers
directly,5 8 it may not investigate or commence any proceedings
against a bank for violation of an MSRB rule without first notifying
and consulting with the appropriate bank agency "concerning the
effect of such proposed action on sound banking practices." 59
It thus seems likely that SEC initiatives may be restrained at this
consultation stage in the interest of minimizing harmful publicity.
Quiet settlement of the matter might be advised in order to retain
public confidence in the target banks, thus leaving investors unaware that securities-law violations may have occurred.
C. Administrative Inefficiencies
The previous two sections have focused on inherent structural
and philosophical tensions in the MSRB enforcement scheme, produced when banking and securities activities are mingled in a single
entity and securities laws are enforced by bank regulators. This
section identifies a series of more minor, pragmatic shortcomings in
this complex enforcement scheme which may also cause inefficient
or uneven enforcement.
1. Coordination of Inspection
One of the MSRB's basic functions is to specify minimum
compliance standards for municipal-securides broker-dealers and
55 See Bank Securities Activity, SEC Final Report to Congress, FED. SEc. L.
Rn . (CCH) (Special Report No. 701) (July 5, 1977).
56 Id. 46 (quoting Co wsamorLmL GmimiA OF THE U.S., FEDEEiAL Sup-navmsoN
ov STATE AND NATIONAL BANYs, Highlights at 15 (1977)).
57
See note 28 supra.
5
s See § 15B(a)(6)(C) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(6)(C) (1976)
("Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to impair or limit . . . the power
of the Commission... to initiate any.., action pursuant to this chapter ... :").
59
Section 15B(c)(6)(A) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78o-4(c)(6)(A)

(1976).
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to provide for regular examinations to ensure that these minimum
standards are being met.0 0 In principle, the inspection requirement is straightforward; but, because the inspection duties are
distributed among several agencies with their own, different timetables already in place, the frequency of inspection varies from
one municipal-securities dealer to another. Brokerage firms subject to the SEC are examined on a random schedule,8 1 for example,
whereas banks under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board
are inspected only once a year.6 2 Other banks will be visited twice
a year G3 and still others on schedules established by state bank
examiners.6 4 Just implementing the inspection requirement imposed on municipal-securities dealers has, therefore, required careful and complex coordination by the MSRB.6 5
2. Cost of Enforcement
Because inspection and disciplinary actions are carried out by
either the SEC or one of the federal banking agencies, the enforcement scheme on which the MSRB depends is itself dependent on
federal funding. This is in contrast to the corporate-securities
market where a large share of the enforcement costs is borne by the
industry participants themselves. Securities dealers pay dues to the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), a registered
self-regulatory organization which relieves the SEC of many of its
enforcement activities.6 6 Such a saving cannot accrue to the federal
government in the municipal-securities industry so long as commercial banks, already subject to banking-agency regulations,
participate in this market. They will inevitably object that membership in the NASD or a similar registered association of municipal-securities dealers would subject them to duplicative regu67
lation.
6
0Section 15B(b)(2)(E) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78o-4(b)(2)(E)
(1976), specifically directs the MSRB to "specify the minimum scope and frequency
of examinations."
61 See generally § 17(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b) (1976), under
which the SEC conducts inspections.
62 12 U.S.C. § 485 (1976).
63 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1976)
(those subject to the Comptroller of the Currency).
64 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1976) (those under the authority of the FDIC).
65 See Wallison, supra note 39, at 312-14.
66 For an excellent analysis of the role of self-regulation in the securities
industry see M.H. Cohen, Competition, Regulation and Self-Regulation in the Securities Markets (Nov. 18, 1974) (address given at the Center for the Study of Financial
Institutions, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (on file at the U. Pa. L. Rev.).
6T
7See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
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Moreover, the banking agencies themselves have "continually
opposed the regulation of banks through quasi-governmental, selfregulatory associations." 6s Indeed, so long as banking agencies
have a role in enforcing rules in the municipal-securities market,
the cost of expanding investor protection will likely be borne by
the federal government, partly through appropriations to those
banking agencies.
3. Potential SEC Interference with Rulemaking
Although enforcement difficulties predominate, the promulgation of rules governing the municipal-securities industry can also
be a source of controversy. Ultimate say concerning the rules of
the MSRB is vested in the SEC. The Commission is authorized
to disapprove, add to, or delete from an MSRB rule.69 Yet exercise
of this prerogative could produce considerable friction if the SEC
uses this power to override an action taken by the MSRB that
reflects the views of its banking-community representatives.7 0 By
granting such authority, Congress clearly intended the SEC to have
the power to override the MSRB in unusual circumstances; but
it is questionable whether this power can ever be effectively exercised when the law requires that enforcement of such rules be a
cooperative effort between the SEC and the banking agencies. 71
Ultimately, one is left with a recurrent impression: the ability of
the SEC to react swiftly to undesirable practices in the municipalsecurities industry is significantly hampered by the participation
of commercial banks as dealers and the awkward regulatory structure which their presence has spawned.
The dual enforcement scheme described in this part of the
Comment leads not only to philosophical conflicts and administrative inefficiencies. The scheme, and its intrinsic structural weaknesses, also impede regulation of the most egregious practices in
the securities marketplace: trading abuses by the dealer or underwriter, and fraud by the issuer. These two areas will be discussed
below.
6s S. BE., supra note 18, at 46, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, at 224.

69 Section 19(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1976). This section
describes the SEC's power to amend "rules of self-regulatory organizations." Id.
The rules of the MSRB, promulgated pursuant to § 15B(b) (2) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. §78o-4(b) (2) (1976), are considered "rules of a self-regulatory
organization," as defined in § 3(a)(28) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(28)
(1976). See generally Dikeman, supra note 22, at 922.
70 For a description of the composition of the MSRB, see note 31 supra.
71 See note 38 supra & accompanying text.
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MARKETPLACE:

IMPLICATIONS OF BANK UNDERWRITING

A. Policing TradingAbuses
A banking institution engaged in underwriting a security occupies two potentially conflicting roles. At the same time, it may
be both a seller and a purchaser. In particular, banks that underwrite municipal bonds can also purchase the bonds they underwrite, both for their own investment portfolios 72 and for private
trust funds in their fiduciary capacity 3 Current MSRB regulations are inadequate to guard against the risk that, in their role as
underwriters, banking institutions will "dump" slow-moving securities on their trust funds and on correspondent banks 74 or,
alternatively, corner the supply of "hot" issues for their own investment portfolio and favored customers. 75 If banks are allowed
to underwrite revenue as well as general-obligation bonds, the
resulting increase in the volume of municipal securities handled
by bank underwriters 76 will dramatically increase the potential for
such self-dealing abuses. Thus, the problem must be addressed
now, before commercial-bank entry into the revenue-bond market.
72

Commercial banks have been important purchasers in the municipal-bond
market. See JoinT ECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 35; Clark, The Federal Income
Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YAIE L.J. 1603, 1629 (1975). There are
indications that the strength of this participation is waning. See Bagwell, Evans
& Nielsen, The Municipal Bond Market: An Analysis and Suggested Reform, 16
H

v. J. LEcis. 211, 221 (1979).

Banks are granted power to invest in municipal

securities under 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (1976).
73

JOINT EcoN,. Coxmm., supra note 15, at 38.

74The correspondent banking system between so-called "city banks" and
"country banks" is described in STAFF OF HOUsE COMM. ON BANxMr, AND CRmRENcy, 88th CoNG., 2d SEss., A REPoaT ON THE COaRSPONDET BANKING Sysmv
(Subcomm. Print 1964).
See also M. STrIum, Tri- MONEY MNA=T: MYTH,
REALITY AND PRAcTICE (1978).
In return for "country banks"' placing deposit

balances with them, major banks offer their correspondent banks such services as
check clearing, loan participations, lines of credit, and investment advice. Opportunity probably exists for city banks to condition extension of credit or services to
a correspondent upon securities purchases by such correspondent. See Mehle,
supra note 6, at 1145, 1153.
75 The Senate Committee Report for the Securities Act Amendments of 1975
recognized this potential:
The economic power accruing to banks by virtue of their role as major
consumers as well as underwriters of new issue municipals . . . permit[s]

banks to be underwriter distributors of new issues of municipal bonds and
at the same time and in the same new issue give their own investment
portfolio the prerogatives and priorities of public institutional orders.
S. REP., supra note 18, at 49, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at
227. See also note 82 infra.
76
See notes 15-17 supra & accompanying text.
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I. Current Investor Protection

The problem of self-dealing by bank underwriters has
typically been cast as a problem of unfair competitive advantage.
From the perspective of the securities-firm underwriter, a bank's
own investment account, trust funds, and correspondent banking
network constitute captive markets for the municipal bonds it
underwrites.7 7 The existence of such captive markets allows a
bank to underbid securities firms, confident in the knowledge that,
if necessary, it can deal the securities off to these captives.71
The temptations that such captives represent to bank underwriters, however, have their counterparts in securities firms as
well. In recent years there has been a substantial growth in mutual
funds and municipal-bond unit trusts that invest in tax-exempt
securities,1 9 and which may be under the direct or indirect control of
a securities firm. 0 While these investors do not purchase as large
a share of the overall municipal-securities market as do commercial
banks,81 the existence of captive or controlled funds is nevertheless
common to both bank and nonbank dealers. The real concern
should be with protection of investors from the abusive use of
controlled funds.
Such abuse falls into two categories. First, controlled funds
could be used as a dumping ground for slow securities that are not
selling well in the public market.8 2 Using the bank's own portfolio
77 See Hopewell &Kauman, Commercial Bank Bidding on Municipal Revenue
Bonds: New Evidence, 32 J.FjIxAcE 1647, 1648 (1977); Meble, supra note 6, at
1142.
78
Knowing the existence of demand for a given security at a given price is
crucial to competitive bidding. See Mehle, supra note 6, at 1142. See also note 18
supra.
79From November 1978 to November 1979 the total assets of mutual funds
that trade solely in municipal bonds increased from $2.749 billion to $3.415 billion.
LnESTAmT CoP"ANY INSrrruTE, TEmnms w MUTuAL FUND Acvrvrrms Table 3
(Nov. 1979).
80 The relationship of investment companies to their affiliated securities firms
has been at the heart of much recent litigation. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552
F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533
F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); Moses v. Burgin, 445
F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). See also Martin, Federal
Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Legislative Proposal, 127 U. PA.
L. BRE. 316, 336 (1978); Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directorsof Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. RIv. 1058 (1967).
81 The $700 million increase in mutual fund investment in state and local government securities is quite small compared to the $33 billion increase in similar
investments by commercial banks. Compare INvEsTMENT ComI'ANY INsnrun,
TrENDs n MUTuAL FUND ACnvnr'S Table 3 (Nov. 1979), with FEDERAL RESERvE
BoAM or GovEnNons, FLOW OF FuNDs STA rnrMNT 17 (May 9, 1979).
82

See Meble, supra note 6, at 1143-44. This problem was severe in the years

before the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted.

See W.N. PAcAH, THE SEcUtrrY ArYIrm-
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to rescue mispriced underwritings 8 3 might be against the interests
of the bank's shareholders; likewise, dealing such bonds to the trust
department threatens unfairness to beneficiaries.8 4
A second, converse abuse is the favoring of controlled funds to
the detriment of customers with no connection to the underwriter.
An underwriter might favor its own portfolio when an attractive
issue is involved; indeed, it might engage in speculation by "withholding" a "hot" issue in an intermediate account to await an
expected rise in the market price after the underwriting period. 5
Alternatively, a municipal-securities underwriter might discriminate
unfairly among investors by offering price discounts to favored cutomers without affecting the price at which the bonds are offered to
the general public."6 Such practices were recently exposed in the
corporate-securities market by the "Papilsky" hearings conducted
by the SEC. 8 7 The corporate-security industry's self-regulatory
body, the NASD, responded to such evidence of withholding and
discriminatory dealing by amending its Rules of Fair Practice to
check the abuses; s8 but these rules are inapplicable to transactions
in municipal securities.8 9
ATES OF NATIONAL BANKS 116, 131 (1941), reprinted in 58 JomHs HoP=Ns U. STuD.
IST. POL. SCr. at 554, 569 (1940).
Note that the price of a bond issuance is fixed by the underwriting syndicate
before the distribution commences. A mispriced issue cannot be "moved" simply
by lowering the price until the syndicate breaks.
83 See Mehle, supra note 6, at 1143.
8
4 Although statutes and common law prevent banks as trustees from profiting
through the sale of securities to their trust accounts, a trust department may purchase from the bank's underwriting account if the trust instrument so permits. See
Mehle, supra note 6, at 1144-45.
85 Id. 1143 n.116. At the time the author wrote in 1975, the MSRB had
just been created and he predicted that "'[w]ithholding' would likely be an outlawed practice under any rules promulgated pursuant to new legislation to regulate
the municipal security industry." Id. Moreover, the drafters of the Securities Act
Amendments of 1975 were aware of the potential problem. See S. REP., supra
note 18, at 49, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CoDE CoNGc. & AD. NEws at 227. However,
no MSRB Rule promulgated to date has directly outlawed withholding. For an
examination of the steps the Board has taken, see note 101 infra.
86
These methods include overtrading in "swap transactions" (accepting old
bonds in payment for new bonds at less than the par value of the new issue) and
free provision of services such as investment research. See Sec. Act Rel. No. 3415807, 44 Fed. Reg. 28,574, 28,575 (1979).
87 So called because of the case Papilsky v. Berndt, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. RuP. (CCH) gf95,627 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which the practices first came to judicial attention. For the substance of these hearings and the
proposed NASD rule changes in response to the hearings, see See. Act Rel. No.
15020, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,446 (1978), and Sec. Act Rel. No. 15807, 44 Fed. Reg.
28,574 (1979).
88
For example, the NASD Rules of Fair Practice prohibit insider purchases of
"hot securities," NASD MANUAL (CCH) 112168; require setting forth the public
offering price, id. If2157; and require that all securities "swapped" for newly
issued securities be traded at "fair market value," id. If2158.
89 Section 15A(f) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(f) (1976).
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The risk of unfair practices in the municipal-securities market
is hardly foreclosed by the rules so far promulgated by the MSRB. 90
When the underwriting is done by a brokerage firm, the inadequacy
of the MSRB rules may be harmless because overlapping regulations
are promulgated and enforced by the SEC. When, however, the
underwriting of a municipal bond is done by a bank, the safeguards
are considerably reduced. Such unequal regulation results not only
in unequal competition between bank and nonbank dealers, but
also in inconsistent protection of investors.
a. Safeguards Applicable to Securities-Firm Underwriters
Unfair sales by securities-firm underwriters to their affiliated
investment companies are prevented by strict regulation of the purchaser by the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940.91
Section 10(f) 92 of the Act specifically regulates transactions between
investment companies and affiliated underwriters during the underwriting period,93 while section 17 94 regulates transactions generally
between such affiliated parties. Regulations promulgated under
section 10(f) require that investment companies affiliated with
underwriters can only purchase new issues from the underwriters at
terms which are equivalent to those offered to the general public. 95
Section 17 sets similar limitations on such transactions after the
underwriting period. 96 The reporting requirements imposed by
the Investment Company Act and enforced by the SEC 97 make close
scrutiny of such transactions possible.
b. Safeguards Applicable to Bank Underwriters
When municipal bonds are underwritten by banks, the transaction is not directly subject to the SEC. 98 Thus, any purchases
which the bank makes from itself as underwriter are regulated only
90

See notes 99-107 infra & accompanying text.

9115 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976).
92 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(f) (1976).
93 Congress flatly prohibited such transactions in § 10(f), but delegated authority to the SEC to make such exceptions as it finds appropriate. Hence, the
SEC has promulgated rule 10f-3, 17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-3 (1979), which allows such
purchases under suitable conditions. The SEC recently amended rule 10f-3 to
include municipal securities. Inv. Co. Act Rel. No. 10736, 44 Fed. Reg. 36,152
(1979).
94 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1976).
95 17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-3 (1979).
96 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a), (d) (1976).
07 17 C.F.R. § 27O.10f-3(h) (1979).
98

The "appropriate regulatory agency" for bank securities activities is defined
in section 3(a) (34) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(34) (1976).
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to the extent provided by the MSRB. Section 15B(b)(2)(K) of the
1934 Act 99 gives the MSRB power to regulate transactions between
municipal-securities underwriters and affiliated investment portfolios. To date, the rules promulgated under this section have done
nothing to prevent portfolio purchases. °0 The primary duty imposed has been disclosure by each underwriter to the underwriting
syndicate when it is investing for its account. This rule was designed to ensure equal access to information and fair distribution
of issues among the syndicate members. 1 1 The MSRB powers are
limited, moreover, to the underwriting period. 0 2 Thus, even if
portfolio purchases from a bank's own underwriting account were
flatly prohibited, this limitation would allow the MSRB rules to be
easily evaded. 1 3 No provision with the broad post-underwritingperiod coverage of section 17 of the Investment Company Act is
provided to the MSRB in section

15B.

0

1

As a result, the MSRB

99 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(K) (1976).
100 Significantly, unlike § 10(f) of the Investment Company Act, see notes 92,
95 supra & accompanying text, § 15B (b) (2) (K) of the 1934 Act does not authorize
the MSRB to prohibit portfolio purchases altogether. Congress feared that to forbid
banks from purchasing the municipal bonds they underwrote would make it too
difficult for municipalities to find alternative buyers. See S. REP., supra note 18,
at 49, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 227.
101 The MSRB has adopted Rule C-11 as its primary response to this congressional mandate. See [1978] 469 SEc. BEG. & L. REP. (BNA) at E-1 to E-3. The
thrust of the regulations is to increase the amount of information disclosed by
underwriters in a syndicate to the syndicate manager. The syndicate manager, in
turn, is obligated to ensure that all members of the syndicate have access to the
information that is provided to him. For example, each underwriter must reveal
the type and sometimes the identity of the portfolio for which it is placing a
purchase order.
The rationale appears to be that by increasing the scope of information available to syndicate managers and members, other municipal securities professionals
and the investing public will also obtain such information and be able to act upon
it. Whether such exchange of information within the syndicate is sufficient to
prevent speculative practices by underwriters is debatable; and it certainly does not
address the problem of "swapping" or other methods by which underwriters benefit
favored customers. See note 87 supra & accompanying text.
For an indication that commercial banks resisted earlier efforts to extend rule
-11 disclosure, see PSA Reverses Position on G-11, Warmy BoND BUYER, July 3,
1978, at 1, col. 2; [1978] 437 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at F-2.
102Section 15B(b)(2)(K) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78o-4(b)(2)(K)

(1976), explicitly limits the scope of any "terms and conditions" set by the MSRB
to portfolio purchases made "during the underwriting period."
The author suggests that such a pro1o3 See Mehle, supra note 6, at 1151.
hibition would still leave bank portfolios free to purchase from other underwriters
in the syndicate during the offering period. The opportunity for speculation in a
hot issue would thus remain unaffected; conversely, a "bail out" could also be
arranged.
104 In addition to its longer period of coverage, the Investment Company Act
maximizes control over self-dealing by a securities-firm underwriter by defining its
"affiliated persons" very broadly. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (3) (1976) (5% ownership
test). Banking law generally restricts its coverage to a narrower category of
"affiliates." See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b) (1) (1976) (50% ownership test).
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is unable to prevent banks as underwriters from using their own
portfolios or trust funds to bail themselves out of a slow-moving
security. No attention is paid to the potential for overreaching in
transactions with correspondent banks. 1

5

No rules equivalent to

the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice exist to police discriminatory
treatment of favored purchasers 106 or prevent the withholding of
issues for purposes of speculation. 07
The contrasts between the MSRB regulations and the Investment Company Act point to the lack of consistency in Congress's
attitude towards the municipal-securities market. The latter statute
reflects the typically tough federal stance on conflicts-of-interests in
securities transactions. 0 8 Yet when Congress noted the potential
conflict in banks serving as both underwriters and purchasers of
bonds, the usual concern with market fairness and safety was then
balanced against a perception that the existing large volume of bank
purchases of municipal bonds was critical to the ability of local
to raise funds and thus could not be overly congovernments
9

stricted.1-0

The potential for abuse described above exists, of course, because banks that underwrite general-obligation bonds are subject to
different standards of conduct than are securities houses participating in the same market. If the Glass-Steagall Act is amended to
permit bank underwriting of revenue bonds, the resulting increase
105 See note 74 supra.
106 See, e.g., Proposed Amendment to Art. 3I1, § 24, of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD, Sec. Act Rel. No. 15020, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,447 (1978); and
Proposed New § 36 of Art. III and Interpretation Thereof, Rules of Fair Practice,
id. 35,448, which together would regulate the practices of institutional purchasers
during underwritings. See also notes 86-87 supra & accompanying text.
107 The Board of Governors of the NASD adopted an interpretation of that
organization's Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 1, to prohibit "withholding" in the
corporate securities market. See NASD MANuA. (CCH) Ir2151.
108 Indeed, in the very same year the MSRB was established, Congress did not
hesitate to separate so-called "money-management" and brokerage functions in the
corporate-securities area, when evidence disclosed that a broker might manage the
stock portfolios of his clients so that his volume of transactions-and hence his
commissions-were increased. See S. REPn., supra note 18, at 60, 63, 64, reprinted
in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 238-39, 242.
Section 11(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78k(a) (1976) was amended in
1975 to prohibit stock exchange members from trading for their own accounts or
for accounts they managed except under limited circumstances. The strange story
of the birth of § 11(a) is told in H. Bwns, TnE LA W OF LNvEswmNr MANArEnr
IT10.02 (1978).
The prohibitions against combining brokerage and money management in § 11(a)
only apply to transactions conducted on a stock exchange floor or using the NASD's
Automated Quotations System (NASDAQ), see Art. XVI, NASD By-Laws, NASD
1651-1654. Hence, they do not apply to municipal securities.
MAN AL (CCH) ITIT
109 See note 100 supra & accompanying text.
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in bank-underwritten municipal bonds would have a direct and
immediate effect on the ability of this bifurcated regulatory system
to successfully control trading abuses.
An increase in bank participation in the municipal-securities
market would have long-range effects as well. Specifically, the
presence of banks as revenue-bond underwriters would-given the
present regulatory system-hinder potential imposition of disclosure
and registration requirements on the municipal-securities issuer and
underwriter. It is to this more far-reaching and speculative issue
that we now turn.
B. Imposing Disclosure Requirements
In 1975 Congress stopped short of imposing registration and
disclosure requirements on issuers of municipal securities." 0 The
current reluctance to impose these requirements is attributable
partly to doubts over the constitutionality of direct federal intrusion
into local fiscal affairs,"'. and partly to a fear that the cost of such
requirements would be prohibitive to state and local governments
and would exceed the likely benefits to investors." 2 A number of
110 Section 15B(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (1976).

" Two constitutional problems may arise if federal standards are imposed on
the issuance of securities by state and local governments. In National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Supreme Court invalidated certain portions
of federal labor laws as they applied to state and local governments. The Usery
Court found notions of state sovereignty embodied in the tenth amendment that
limited Congress's power under the commerce clause. The application of Usery to
securities laws is discussed in detail in Council on Municipal Performance, Certain
Legal Considerations Pertaining to Proposed Federal Legislation With Respect to
Municipal Securities (Oct. 13, 1977) (memo commissioned by the Council on
Municipal Performance from Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside & Wolff). See also
Comment, The Liability of Issuers of Municipal Securities, 31 BAYLOn L. REv. 551
(1979); Note, Federal Securities Fraud Liability and Municipal Issuers: Implications
of National League of Cities v. Usery, 77 COLUM. L. R!v. 1064 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as CoLuM. Note]; Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities Issuers: Applying the Test of National League of Cities v. Usery, 51
N.Y.U. L. REv. 982 (1976) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U. Note]; Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities: Disclosure Requirements and Dual Sovereignty, 86
YALE L.J. 919 (1977) [hereinafter cited as YArLE Note].
The eleventh amendment of the U.S. Constitution poses a second constitutional difficulty, since it may bar private damage actions against state governments.
See COLUM. Note, supra, at 1080-81 (Congress retains the power to establish basis
for waiver in the future by expressly providing for private causes of action for
damages against state governmental issuers); but see YAIE Note, supra, at 928-29
n.36.

Private remedies against municipal governments are not affected by the eleventh
amendment, and indeed, the recent decisions in Owen v. City of Independence, 48
U.S.L.W. 4389 (U.S. April 15, 1980) and in Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), clearly demonstrate a willingness to impose liability on a
municipality.

11 2 See generally Doty, SEC Urged to Consider Damage of Due Diligence
Requirements to Market, DArry BOND BUYER, Oct. 5, 1977, reprinted in PntcsunG
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commentators, however, suggest that a regimen of disclosure requirements could be designed to pass constitutional muster; 113 and the
financial crises in New York City 114 and Cleveland"" suggest that
investors may indeed be jeopardized by lack of information.,1 6 The
municipal issuers themselves have voluntarily attempted to improve
disclosure, 117 and legislation has been introduced in Congress since
1975 to impose disclosure requirements."$ Thus, though the problems of implementing disclosure requirements are speculative, the
issue is far from settled, and it is important to consider the effect
that commercial-bank expansion into the revenue-bond market
would have on the question.
At a time when the bulk of municipal bonds were general
obligations, the need for disclosure was mitigated by the riskfree
nature of the bonds and the fact that the information needed to
estimate their quality-such as debt per capita, the mil rate, and
the general wealth of the community-is generally public knowledge." 9 However, with the dramatic increase in issuance of revenue
bonds, 120 the security of which depends on the success of a particular
project, disclosure requirements have become more appropriate.
These bonds may present risks similar to those of corporate bonds,' 2 '
MuIciPAL BoNDs at 81 (1978); Doty & Petersen, The Federal
Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 283
(1976).
1 3 See CoLUM. Note, YALE Note, and N.Y.U. Note, supra note 111.
114 See note 23 supra.
115 In spite of Cleveland's default, the last five years have been a relatively
stable time in municipal finance. See Levin, State and Local Government Fiscal
Position in 1978, 58 SuavEwY CumwNT Bus. No. 12, at 19 (Dec. 1978). There are
signs, however, that the good times may be over. Another Drag on the Economy,
Bus. WFx , Oct. 1, 1979, at 44.
116 See, e.g., the allegation of damages by investors who purchased New York
City bonds just before the city's near financial collapse. In re New York Municipal
Securities Litigation, [Current] Fim. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 97,258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
See note 47 supra.
7
1 The Municipal Finance Officers Association (MFOA)
has led the way
toward voluntary disclosure. See MFOA, DIsCLosuE GumEn:ms FoR OFFMUNcS
Or SEcumrrs By STATE AND LocAL GovEsN'rs (1976); MFOA GCuiExuis
FoR UsE By STATE AND LocAL Govmwmmrs IN THE PREpAuATiON OF ANuAL
DIscr.osutE DocumENrs AND OmnE CumiENT DiscLosuEs (1976). A sympathetic
view of the current state of disclosure in the municipal-securities market can be
found in Doty, Municipal Disclosure-Recent Developments, 11 UnB. Law. v
(1979).
118 See, e.g., S. 2339, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 3323, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978).
119 YALE Note, supra note 111, at 941.
120 See notes 14-15 supra & accompanying text.
121 See note 6 supra; ST =a-n & PooR's MumcIPAL BoND RlxwG CRnTERI,
reprinted in Municipal Bonds Rating Regulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 675, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976); YAimn Note, supra
LAw TNsTrrYuI,
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and the information needed to assess the credit risk is generally
less public.
If revenue bonds continue to be underwritten solely by general securities houses, the problems of implementing disclosure
requirements, should they be mandated, will be manageable. The
SEC machinery 122-already working in the corporate-securities market-could easily be modified to suit the revenue bond market. If,
on the other hand, commercial banks are permitted to underwrite
and deal in revenue bonds, familiar problems would arise. First,
the current regulatory scheme, which divides enforcement responsibilities between the SEC and the banking agencies, 123 would
enable investors to receive different information, depending on
whether the underwriter is a bank or a securities firm and so
reports directly to a banking agency or the SEC.124 Such uneven
enforcement could occur if the agency's sole responsibility was to
check and investigate registration statements; but the disparity is
even more likely to develop if the appropriate enforcement staff
is informally consulted in the drafting of registration statements
and thereby influences their content.

25

A second, even more serious problem would result if disclosure
requirements were imposed in the municipal-securities area. Such
requirements would undoubtedly raise the standard of care and
note 111, at 924-25 n.21, 943. The author of the latter note cites "the likelihood of
fluctuations in project revenues, the detailed analysis needed to assess credit risk,
and the incentives for project officials to color disclosures to avoid bondholder
unrest," as factors reinforcing the need for disclosure requirements. Id. 949 (footnotes omitted). The higher interest rates on revenue bonds (.25 to 1.50 percentage
points) may also reflect a perception that they are a riskier investment than general
obligations. Id. 924-25 n.21.
122 See notes 131-33 infra & accompanying text.
128 See notes 43-71 supra & accompanying text.
124Such inequality of investor protection has been sharply criticized in
another context where bank and brokerage firm activities overlap. See Lybecker,
supra note 54, at 1011-12:
It seems clear, moreover, that it is no longer legally sufficient or
appropriate to defer conclusively to the historical serendipity of whatever
type of regulation a particular financial institution is used to receiving;
rather, the reconciling standard or focus . . . must be the investor protections which ought to exist, whoever is offering the investment management service.
125The disclosure requirements for corporate securities are laid out simply in
Schedule A of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976). One facet of the process,
not widely known outside of the securities bar, however, is the degree to which
informal communications between the filers of registration statements and the SEC
enforcement staff are relied upon to facilitate composition of the registration statement. See C. ScmmmER, J. MANKo & R. KANT, GoiNG PuBLic: PnAccE, PaoAND CONSEQUENCES 18 (1979). It is difficult to conceive that registration
CEDu
procedures developed by two separate agencies would result in identical disclosure
on both sides, given the extent to which informal communications play a role in the
current process.
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hence the liabilities imposed on banks in their role as municipalsecurities underwriters. 126 Under rule lOb-5, banks are held accountable for disclosure of any material information that they have
pertaining to an issuer of government bonds. 127 But since liability
under the rule requires proof of scienter, 28 bank underwriters
will not be liable for information not in their possession-which
may be considerable, given that municipal issuers are not legally
bound to disclose. 2 9 The contrast with laws compelling disclosure
in the corporate-securities market is striking. The corporate issuer
is compelled to submit detailed information to both the SEC and its
purchasers, 130 with penalties attached if material errors or omissions
occur in its statements. 131 Compliance is enforced, in part by
direct SEC inspection of the registration materials, but also by the
threat of private suits. Underwriters play a crucial role in this
disclosure process: they may be sued by purchasers for failure to
correct a material misstatement or omission, 32 and simple ignorance
is not a defense. Rather, the underwriter is charged with exercising "due diligence" and may avoid liability only after showing
that a "reasonable investigation" was made and failed to uncover
the error1as
126 Indeed, it is the fear of liabilities similar to those imposed on corporate
underwriters that is foremost in the minds of those opposing registration requirements

for municipal securities. See Doty, supra note 112, at 83-84; B. DoWr, The
Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act of 1977-Analysis of Provisions and
Arguments 5 (Feb. 20, 1978) (bulletin of the Municipal Finance Officers Ass'n).
127In re New York Municipal Securities Litigation, [Current] Fun. SEC. L.
REP. 797,258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See notes 47-48 supra & accompanying text.
128 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
129 Section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(2)
§ 15B(d)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(2) (1976).
130 Sections 6-8, 10 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-77h, 77j (1976).
'31
Sections
132

(1976);

11-12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1976).

Section 11(a)(5) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77k(a)(5) (1976).

133Section 11(b)(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77k(b)(3) (1976). See
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REv.
1, 199 (1969).
One court has stated the role of the underwriter in the disclosure process in the
following terms: "[U]nderwriters . . . are supposed to assume an opposing posture
with respect to management. The average investor probably assumes that some
issuers will lie, but he probably has somewhat more confidence in the average level of
morality of an underwriter who has established a reputation for fair dealing." Feit
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
Similarly, one commentator concluded that
[o]nly the underwriter and the accountant are free to assume an adverse
role, have little incentive to accept the risk of liability, and possess the
facilities and competence to undertake an independent investigation.
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The municipal-securities investor would thus receive considerably more protection if disclosure requirements patterned after
those in the 1933 Act were applied to municipal bonds. However,
to increase the standard of care and hence the liabilities imposed
on municipal-securities bank underwriters-without isolating their
operations and funds from the bank as a whole-may stir depositors'
concern over the safety of their funds. Once again, the conflict-ofinterest between the investor and the bank depositor may lead to
inadequate protection of both interests. Complications like these,
caused by bank underwriting and its present regulation, will significantly hamper the movement for disclosure by municipal issuers. The system must be changed now, before bank entry into
the revenue bond market and before disclosure requirements are
imposed.
IV.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Extension of commercial-bank underwriting to revenue bonds
would increase the pressures for transactions by bank dealers to be
scrutinized as closely as any other securities activity. There are
three ways in which the need for stricter regulation could be met.
Much of the potential abuse would be removed if Congress prohibited banks from making portfolio purchases from their own
underwriting accounts. This has been a typical feature of bills
134
proposing that banks be allowed to underwrite revenue bonds.
However, not only would such a flat prohibition be susceptible to
evasion, 135 it would also run counter to the entire thrust of previous
congressional securities legislation. Congress has traditionally preferred to delegate rulemaking authority to administrative agencies
and industry organizations in the securities area. 13 6

These bodies

are capable of adopting regulations much more finely tuned to the
complexities of the marketplace than any "rigid proscriptions im137
posed" by outside legislators.
• . . [The underwriter] must make an investigation reasonably
calculated to reveal all of those facts which would be of interest to a

reasonably prudent investor.
Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUM. L. Rm,. 1411, 1421
(1968) (footnote omitted).
'34

See, e.g., S. 1378, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(2)-(5) (1979).

135 See note 103 supra.
136 See S. REP., supra note 18, at 47, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 224.
137 Id. 47, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. Nzws at 224-25.
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Congress followed this strategy when it delegated rulemaking
authority to the MSRB. 138 This suggests an obvious second means
of increasing investor protection in this field: namely, the MSRB
could devise tougher, more comprehensive rules comparable to
those imposed by the Investment Company Act 139 or the NASD.' 40
However, so long as inspection and enforcement powers remain
bifurcated and partly lodged in the banking agencies, the analysis
in Part II casts doubt on whether the goals of maximum investor
protection could actually be achieved thereby.
This leaves the third and most promising alternative. Since
it is the mingling of banking and underwriting activities which
creates the difficulties of inspection and enforcement, the most direct method for alleviating the difficulties would be to isolate the
municipal-securities underwriting activities of banks in separate subsidiaries or affiliates and to subject these affiliates, along with
brokerage-firm underwriters of municipal bonds, to a unified system of enforcement modeled after current corporate-securities
regulation.
A. A Proposal: Securities Affiliates Within Banks
In drafting the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Congress
appreciated the value of separating underwriting activity from the
other functions within a bank, but the drafters ultimately took
only a limited step in that direction. The amendments provide
that a bank may establish a "separately identifiable department or
division" in which to carry on its municipal-securities activities. 4 1
If such a separately identifiable department or division is established, it rather than the entire bank registers as a municipal-securities dealer. 142 Such an arrangement does not, however, provide
138 Section 15B(b)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78o-4(b)(1) (1976).
See S. Erp., supra note 18, at 46, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws
at 223-24 (preference for self-regulatory mechanism).
139 See notes 91-97 supra & accompanying text.
140
See notes 106-07 supra & accompanying text.
141 Section 3(a)(30) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(30) (1976).
Section 15B(b)(2)(H), 15 U.S.C. §78o-4(b)(2)(H) (1976) specifies that the
MSRB shall define the term "separately identifiable department or division." This
term is defined in MSRB rule 4, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,420 (1975).
142 Registration with the SEC under the 1934 Act follows a complex scheme.
Section 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1976), exempts banks from the definition
of broker-dealer (presumably because the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits banks from
securities activities). Hence banks do not have to register as broker-dealers under
§ 15(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976). The definition of "municipal
securities dealer" in §3(a)(30), 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(30) (1976), excludes banks
unless the bank is dealing in municipal securities but is not doing so through a
separately identifiable department or division (as defined by MSRB rule G-1). See
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sufficient separation for purposes of effectively policing unfair
underwriting practices. In the first place, the definition of "separately identifiable department or division" allows personnel from
a variety of bank departments to belong to the separate division
and does not require that they confine themselves to municipalsecurities matters. 143 The chief merit of the "separate department"
is that it is required to maintain separately accessible records pertaining to its municipal-securities transactions so as to facilitate
regulatory inspection. 144 However, the failure to isolate the funds
involved in the underwriting activity subjects depositors' funds to
the risk of liabilities incurred by the bank as underwriter. Under
such circumstances, bank agencies will likely prefer their traditional
policy of quiet supervision and intervention in the interests of
depositor protection to the SEC's customary policy of making investigations public. 145 Concern for public confidence in the banks
is legitimate since, absent a more identifiable separation, losses in
the bank's municipal-securities activities may weaken public confidence in the bank as a whole.
A requirement that banks isolate their municipal-securities
activities in a separately capitalized affiliate rather than a separate
"department" as defined above would afford several advantages. It
would allow the traditional full-disclosure policy of securities regulation to be applied to the activities and finances of the affiliate
without calling into question the soundness of the rest of the bank
note 141 supra. If the bank is using a separately identifiable department or division,
only that unit need register as a municipal securities dealer with the SEC under
§ 15B(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a) (1976). Otherwise, the entire bank must register.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Ba2-1 (a) (1979) ("An application for registration pursuant
to Section 15B(a) of the Act, of a municipal securities dealer which is a bank ...
or a separately identifiable department or division of a bank (as defined by the
[MSRBI), shall be filed with the Commission . . . ").
The SEC has taken the position that a subsidiary of a bank or bank holding
company which is not, itself, a bank or separately identifiable department within a
bank must register with the SEC as a broker-dealer under §3(a)(4)-(5) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(4)-(5) (1976) and §15(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o (1976). Sec. Act Rel. No. 11742, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,772, 49,774
(1975). The consequence of such status is that the "appropriate regulatory agency"
for inspecting the subsidiary becomes the SEC rather than the banking agencies.
This result may act as an incentive for banks not to conduct existing municipal
securities activities through subsidiaries.
143MSRB rule 4(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 49,420 (1975).
See Walison, supra note
39, at 324-25 n.145. The rule requires that certain officers be identified as
responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the bank's municipal-securities affairs,
but their activities, too, are not restricted to such affairs. See FaAcnsjNG LAw
INSTr, BAN s AND THE SEcunrnEs LAws 600-01 (1976).
144 MSRB rule 4(a) (2), 40 Fed. Reg. 49,420 (1975).

1 45 See notes 51-54 supra & accompanying text.
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and raising depositors' fears over the safety of their funds.1 46 Indeed, since they would not conduct any banking activity, separatelyoperated securities affiliates of commercial banks could be treated
as full-fledged broker-dealers and regulated as such, without fear of
147
subjecting them to duplicative or inconsistent banking regulation.
The primary justification for the existing bifurcated enforcement
scheme, with all its shortcomings, would no longer apply. A
homogeneous municipal-securities industry would result, which
could be directly policed by the MSRB, the SEC, or a new selfregulatory organization of municipal-securities dealers, modeled
after the NASD in the corporate securities field.148 In this way,
investors in municipal bonds could be afforded maximum, uniform
protection from deceptive practices and from overreaching by underwriters who are tempted to speculate in hot issues or use "captive"
markets such as trust funds or correspondent banks as dumping
grounds for slow-moving issues.'4 9 Purchases during the underwriting period made by a bank's affiliate for the bank's own portfolio, favored customers, or potentially captive markets, would not
have to be flatly prohibited, but could simply be scrutinized for
fairness to the same extent that transactions between brokerage
firms and their affiliated' mutual funds are now inspected. 15 0
The affiliate structure will have much the same prophylactic
effect as the "walls" 11 currently erected between lending and trust
departments within banks to restrict the flow of nonpublic infor152
mation which might be illegally used in investment decisions.
In addition, isolation of underwriting activities from the bank
would avert the concern that aggressive regulation of such activity
might too severely undermine public confidence in the bank as a
whole. 153 The identity of a separate affiliate is less likely than a
"separate department or division" to be confused with that of the
entire bank.
1 6

4

See note 49 supra & accompanying text.

47

See note 36 supra & accompanying text.

1

148

See notes 193-200 infra.

9
14 See notes 74-75 and 82-85 supra & accompanying text.

1 50 See notes 91-97 supra & accompanying text
51
'
See Herzel & Coiling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks,
34 Bus. LAw. 73 (1978).
152 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), precludes trading on nonpublic
-undisclosed material information. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
4(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
153 See notes 48-49 supra & accompanying text
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B. The History of the Securities Affiliate
The use of securities affiliates by banks is not novel. Before
the major reforms in financial regulation imposed by Congress in
the midst of the Great Depression, 54 securities affiliates of national
banks were quite common. When the crash came, securities affiliates
were blamed for a great deal of the speculation and chicanery in
the financial markets 155 and were explicitly banned by the GlassSteagall Act. : 56 Senator Glass reserved some of his choicest rhetoric
to excoriate these affiliates. 5 7
In the decade after the crash the definitive work of scholarship
on securities affiliates was produced by W.N. Peach. 158 Peach
described four classes of abuse perpetrated by securities affiliates of
national banks: (1) fraud, deceit, and manipulation in the underwriting of securities; (2) manipulation of the stock of the parent
bank; (3) insider trading; and (4) "dumping" securities in the bank
investment accounts and, conversely, underwriting securities of corporations to enable the bank to get out of bad loans. 59
Peach himself indicated that the first three types of abuse could
be and were attacked by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.16o The fourth class of abuse, however,
was one which he felt was endemic to the combination of investment and commercial banking.' 6 ' Peach's concerns were echoed by
the Supreme Court in Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 62 which
held that a national bank could not operate a collective investment
fund which was, in the Court's eyes, indistinguishable from a
mutual fund.
154 See generally Edwards, Banks and Securities Activities: Legal and Economic Perspectives on the Glass-Steagall Act, in Tim DEmEGuLATioN oF Trm BAusING AND SECURITIES
usams 273, 276 (L. Goldberg & L. White, eds. 1979).

155 See Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems:
Hearings Pursuantto S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1052 (1931).
156 Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1976), explicitly
bans securities affiliates of national banks.

157 See, e.g., 75 CoNG. REc. 9887 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Glass) ("[Olne of
the greatest contributions to the unprecedented disaster which has caused this
almost incurable depression was made by . . . bank affiliates. . . . They were
organized to evade the law. That is the very purpose of their existence .... ").
158 W.N. PEAcH, Tim SE umTy AFFmATES OF NATIONAL BAMS (1941),

reprintedin 58 JoHNs Hopxms U. STUD. IsT. POL. SCL at 439 (1940).
159 Id. 113-14, reprinted in 58 JoNs HoPmzcs U. Srtu. HIST. POL. Sc.

551-52.

at

160 Id. 140-41, reprinted in 58 JonNs Hor, mrns U. SrTU.
hsT. POL. Sc. at
578-79.
161 Id. 14142, reprinted in 58 Joiins HopKs U. STuD. HisT. PoL. Sce. at
579-80.
162401 U.S. 617, 629-34 (1971).
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There are many who feel that the concerns expressed above on
the merits of merging commercial banking and investment banking
services are overstated. 163 However, the breadth of this issue need
not be addressed in considering the question of municipal-revenuebond underwriting. Since Congress found that it was permissible
for banks to underwrite general obligation bonds,16 4 it is difficult to
argue that the concerns expressed above are as serious in the
municipal-securities as in the corporate-securities market. Furthermore, assuming Congress provided the general-obligation exception
so as not to burden the state and local governments in their efforts
to riase funds, 165 the recent growth in the revenue-bond area suggests that continued adherence to a literal reading of this exception
may once again burden the financing of local government.
In addition, there are numerous safeguards built into today's
structure of banking and securities laws which will prevent the
abuses of the pre-Depression days. These safeguards, such as the
rules against bank-insider misconduct, 6 restrictions on loans between banks and affiliates, 167 minimum capital requirements 61 8 and
the panoply of regulations regarding transactions between underwriters and investment funds contained in the Investment Company
Act' 69 are sufficient to forestall recurrence of the abuses of the 20's.
This is particularly true in the municipal-securities market, which,
because of its dearth of secondary trading,17 is not as susceptible to
these problems in the first place.
Finally, the question of the use of securities affiliates per se
must be addressed. It has been argued that the use of affiliates for
bank conduct of any non-banking business is unwise. At least one
commentator has suggested that if the bank and the affiliate have
different sets of stockholders, or if the bank and the affiliate have
163 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 154, at 280-81; U.S.

DEP'T OF TnE

URY,

PuBrac PoLicy ASPECTS OF BANE SEcurmrs Ac-vrrms 3 (issues paper 1975).
164 See notes 3-8 supra & accompanying text.

165 See S. REP., supra note 18, at 49, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. N ws at 227.
166 12 U.S.C. §§ 92a(h), 93, 375 (1976); 12 U.S.C. § 37 5 a (Supp. 111978).
167 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1976).
168 12

U.S.C. § 329 (1976).

169 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10, 80a-17 (1976).
ing text.

See notes 91-97 supra & accompany-

170 See S. REP., supra note 18, at 40, reprinted in [1975] U.S.
AD. NEws at 218.
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different ratios of debt to equity (that is, different leverage), the
bank's management will be tempted to take unnecessary risks.171
The regulatory scheme outlined below addresses these problems
by applying strict regulations to transactions between banks and
affiliates. Indeed, it is difficult to see how some of the possible
abuses could be policed otherwise than by separating the banking
and securities operations. By isolating bank activities into securities
affiliates it will be possible to apply the full range of safeguards
noted above to the municipal-securities activities of commercial
banks. Under current proposals, which do not require that affiliates
be used to conduct securities activities, the same set of safeguards
will be far more difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.

C. A Legislative Proposal
The proposed creation of bank-owned securities affiliates, together with the structural realignment of municipal-securities
regulation made possible by such affiliates, can only be achieved by
amending both the existing securities and banking laws. The various legislative steps required will be outlined in this section. The
net effect of these modifications is that primary jurisdiction over
the underwriting activities of commercial banks would be ceded by
the federal banking agencies to securities regulators in one form
or another.
Before outlining this proposal, however, it is necessary to meet
the objection that Congress could take a "wait-and-see" approach to
the extension of bank underwriting-that is, allow the underwriting
of revenue bonds and see if the MSRB machinery already in place
is capable of meeting problems as they arise. It is submitted, however, that it will be more difficult to separate banking and underwriting activities once the latter have been allowed to expand
See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 154, at 286.
A survey of empirical work on the additional risks experienced by bank holding
companies entering nonbanking activities through affiliates was conducted by the
Staff of the Federal Reserve Board in 1978. FEDmEAL RESERvE BoAnD STAFF
171

CoMauNrum OF PAPas, THE BAN HorL~NG COMPANY MOVsEMNT TO 1978 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as ComTvDsrum]. These studies are inconclusive but suggest that
diversification through affiliates may reduce overall bank holding company risks.
These studies do not, however, address the question whether the nonbanking activity
will be riskier if done through affiliates rather than directly within the bank. Rose,
The Effect of the Bank Holding Company Movement on Bank Safety and Soundness, in CoMLunium, supra 133, 154. Studies of banking affiliates of bank holding
companies do show that these affiliates are somewhat more highly leveraged than
their independent counterparts, but this pattern may vary from area to area. Id.
149. The term "bank holding company" is defined in note 173 infra.
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together. 172 Indeed, the slow pace at which bank holding com3 have divested certain nonbanking operations, as required
panies 17
by the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970,17 suggests that isolation of bank underwriting functions should be required as a prophylactic measure before banks enter the revenuebond market.
1. Municipal-Securities Affiliates and Banking Laws
The use of bank-owned affiliates to perform nonbanking functions permitted to commercial banks under the federal banking laws
is well-established. During the 1960's banks and banking agencies
undertook a policy of expansion of banking activities into a variety
of fields including insurance, data processing, courier services and
travel agencies. 175 By the 1970's these activities were frequently
carried on within a bank-holding-company corporate structure, 7 6
177
using separate subsidiaries to conduct the nonbanking activities.
172 In antitrust litigation courts frequently issue "hold separate" orders in order
to maintain the separate corporate existence of an acquired firm where the acquisition is challenged under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., FTC v. PepsiCo., 477 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1973); FTC v. Exxon Corp., [1979-2] TFADE CAs. ff 62,763 (D.D.C.
July 28, 1979); United States v. United Technologies Corp., 466 F. Supp. 196
(N.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729
(D. Md. 1976). The value of such orders is to facilitate the eventual divestiture
should one be required. Divestiture would be more difficult after the corporations
have mingled assets.
173 A bank holding company is defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 and the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 as "any company
which has control over any bank... " 12 U.S.C. § 184 1(a) (1976).

174 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976). Even with favorable tax treatment for the
divestitures required by the Act, I.R.C. §§ 1101-1103, there has been substantial
difficulty in arranging these transactions. See generally Bank Holding Company
Divestitures: Hearings before the House Ways and Means Comm., 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976). In spite of a ten-year period in which to accomplish divestiture, the
Federal Reserve Board has found it necessary to warn bank holding companies of the
seriousness of violating the January 1, 1980 divestiture deadline. Violations of the
1980 Requirements of the Bank Holding Co. Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,920 (1979)
(FEB Policy Statement).
175 See, e.g., Beatty, What are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of National
Bank Services?, 86 BAN rrn L.J. 3 (1969); Merchant Banking: Is the U.S. Ready
for it? Bus. Whm, April 19, 1976, at 54. Some commentators who have studied
the trend conclude that the mere fact of combination of banking and nonbanking
activities is not per se a problem. See Black, Miller & Posner, An Approach to the
Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, 51 J. Bus. 379, 385 (1978); Clark, The
Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HAnv. L. BEv. 787, 791 (1979).
But see text accompanying note 171 supra.
176 See note 173 supra.
17 7 See Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 606
F.2d 1004, 1010 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Feb.
5, 1980) (No. 79-927).
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The expansion of banking activities undertaken by banks and
banking agencies encountered some resistance in the courts. 17 With
regard to securities activities, a recent decision by the District of
Columbia Circuit 1 79 has reiterated the difficulties that banks face
when they attempt to organize affiliates or holding-company subsidiaries to conduct securities-related business. The court found in
the federal banking laws three distinct bars to banks entering the
securities business. 80 Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act I'l prohibits any single entity from engaging in both investment- and
commercial-banking activities subject to the exception for general
obligation bonds 182; section 20 of the same Act' 8 3 prohibits ownership or control of securities affiliates by banks; section 4(a) of the
Bank Holding Company Act'8 4 prohibits bank holding companies
from owning subsidiaries engaged in securities activities.
It is thus recommended that section 20 of the Glass-Steagall
Act and section 4(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act be
amended to allow banking institutions to own affiliates engaged in
municipal-securities underwriting. Such underwriting must be
confined to affiliates so the exception in Section 21 of the GlassSteagall Act, permitting banks themselves to deal in general obligation bonds, should be repealed. Additionally, the prohibitions on
interlocking directorates between banks and securities firms 's5 must
be made subject to a municipal-securities exception.
The resurrection of the securities affiliate will be successful,
of course, only if strict limitations on credit and other transactions
between the bank and its affiliate are enforced. Bank regulatory
agencies would retain an important role in this area. Section 23A
of the Federal Reserve Act 18 6 limits credit from a bank to any
single affiliate to less than ten percent of the bank's capital and limits
credit to all affiliates to less than twenty percent of the bank
capital. Furthermore, all such loans must be collateralized at between 110% and 120% of their face value.3 7 If bank underwriting
Id. (collecting cases).
179 Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 606 F.2d
178

1004 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1980)
(No. 79-927).
180 Id.1012-13.
181 12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (1) (1976).

182 See note 5 supra.
183 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1976).

184 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1976).

185 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
18612 U.S.C. § 371(c) (1976).
1871d.
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activity is expanded and conducted through affiliates, these loan
restrictions would form a basic component of regulatory policy
and must be rigidly enforced.
2. Municipal-Securities Affiliates and Securities Laws
Parallel modifications would need to be made in the revelant
securities laws affecting municipal bonds. Only affiliates of banks
would be permitted to register as municipal-securities dealers under
section 15B (a) of the 1934 Act, 88 and the permission for banks to
establish "separately identifiable department[s] or division[s]" for
underwriting purposes' 8 s9 would be repealed.
By restricting the affiliates' business to securities transactions,
the relevance of federal banking regulations to their activity is
reduced and the problem of duplicative or inconsistent regulation,
which prompted Congress to deny the MSRB enforcement
powers, 100 is removed. Because separately capitalized and operated underwriting affiliates of commercial banks can be treated as
full-fledged municipal-securities dealers and regulated by securities
specialists inclined to a philosophy of full disclosure,' 91 it would
no longer be necessary to separate the enforcement of municipalsecurities regulation from its promulgation. Section 15B could
therefore be amended to impose strict post-underwriting period
discipline comparable to that provided by the Investment Com1 92
pany Act.
Congress need not, however, impose such regulations directly;
nor, indeed, is this advisable. Market ethics are best adopted by
individuals actually engaged in or familiar with the business,
rather than by Congress. The greater homogeneity of underwriting participants which would result from isolating bank underwriting in securities affiliates would allow Congress to delegate regulatory authority over the municipal-bond market in one of several
ways.
Initially, it might seem most expedient to simply leave the
MSRB in place and grant it uniform enforcement powers over all
municipal-securities dealers. However, to elevate the MSRB to the
18815 U.S.C. §78o-4(a) (1976).
189 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(30) (1976).
190 See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
191 Federal banking authorities would continue to police loan transactions and
other management relations between the bank and its affiliate to ensure that the
separation of capital and operation is actual in fact. See notes 186-87 supra &
accompanying text.
19 2 See notes 91-97 supra& accompanying text.
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status of an independent enforcement agency would require government funding. As currently structured, the MSRB is an independent, though nonmembership, 9 3 self-regulatory organization
and not part of the federal government. It therefore receives no
federal funding, but is authorized to impose reasonable fees on
municipal-securities brokers and dealers in order to defray its
The expense of converting the MSRB into a new fedcosts. 1'
erally-funded agency is bound to encounter political resistance.
Alternatively, the existing separation of promulgation and enforcement could continue, but all enforcement powers could be vested
in the SEC, rather than shared awkwardly with the banking
agencies.
In the corporate-securities market, however, no such full reliance is placed on the SEC, because its resources are limited.
Rather, the industry has relied on self-regulation through the
NASD, its own voluntary organization. This association is composed of industry participants that adhere to the organization's
rules in part because of the economic benefits and services which
membership status confers. 195 Conceivably, the NASD could be
expanded to include municipal-securities dealers19 6 However, the
differing characteristics of the municipal-securities and corporatesecurities markets 197 would mean that not only the regulations but
also the services required by the municipal-bond dealers would
differ from those now imposed and provided by NASD. 9s It is
93

See note 31 supra.
U.S.C. 678o-4(b)(2)(j) (1976). See also Dikeman, supra note 22,
at 911-12.
195 Section 15A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1976), provides generally
for the formation and registration of such self-regulatory associations. Broker-dealers
19415

who choose not to join the NASD are directly subject to oversight by the SEC.
Section 15(b) (8) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (8) (1976).

It should be noted that self-regulation in the corporate securities area is also
performed by the national securities exchanges. See, e.g., §§ 6, 19 of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78f, 78s (1976). However, because municipal securities are traded
in over-the-counter markets, S. REP., supra note 18, at 40-41, reprinted in [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & A. NEws at 218, brokerage flrms or bank securities affiliates
trading only in municipal securities cannot be reached by exchange rules.
196 This would require partial repeal of § 15A(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(f) (1976),
precluding registered securities associations from adapting rules with respect to
municipal securities.
'

97

See note 30 supra.

198 The municipal-securities market is characterized by a relatively small
secondary trading volume and a relatively high percentage of institutional investors.
See note 30 supra & accompanying text. Such a market does not require the

complex trading and quotation system or minimum capital requirements that
constitute much of self-regulation in the corporate-securities area. See, e.g.,

New York Stock Exchange rules 60-79, 325-28, NEw Yoan STocK Exca-A4cE GUrME
2060-2079A, 2325-2328; NASD By-Laws Arts. VII, XVI and Rules of
(CCH) 1111

19SO]
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likely, therefore, that the NASD would have to set up a separate
branch for municipal-securities affairs in any event. Thus, a more
effective alternative is to establish a national association of municipal-securities dealers (NAMSD), comparable in status and
function to the NASD, 99 to deal directly with undesirable practices by their peers. Such an association was contemplated by the
original drafters of the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, but
the idea was ultimately dropped in favor of the nonmembership-,
nonenforcement-oriented MSRB. That compromise satisfied the
commercial bankers who claimed that membership in an NASD20 0
type organization would subject them to duplicative regulation.
If commercial bank underwriters are split off from the rest of the
bank's personnel and functions, however, their activity will be only
indirectly affected by banking regulations and this objection to
membership in a self-regulatory organization registered under the
SEC will no longer have merit.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has attempted to contribute to the debate over
commercial-bank entry into the municipal-revenue-bond market by
examining the proposal from the standpoint of investor protection.
The bulk of commentary and analysis has failed to consider the
impact that such an extension of bank securities activity would have
on the quality of market regulation now and in the future. The
benefits that may result from increased bank activity in this area
can only be achieved by isolating these activities into securities
affiliates, which would function exclusively as full-fledged municipal-securities dealers and thus could be regulated as such,
without deference to the banking agencies. This Comment has
attempted to outline the regulatory system that could be established
to oversee this new municipal-securities marketplace.
Fair Practice Art. II, NASD MwuAL (CCH) Iffl 1501-1505, 1651-1654, 21512184.
It is noteworthy that in other securities markets, such as the federal-government
bond market, where steps have recently been taken toward self-regulation, there
has nonetheless been no attempt to integrate with the NASD. See, e.g., GNMA
Dealers' Efforts at Self-Regulation, [1979] 513 Stc. REG. & L. EP. (BNA) A-9.
199 This, like the expansion of the NASD, could be authorized by providing
that municipal securities are not exempted securities for purposes of § 15A(f) of
the 1934 Ac% 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(f) (1976).
200

See Dikeman, supra note 22, at 909-10.

